Differences in Mood, Optimism, and Risk-Taking Behavior Between American and Chinese College Students.

Mood and optimism have been demonstrated to influence risk-taking decisions; however, the literature on mood, optimism, and decision-making is mixed and conducted primarily with western samples. This study sought to address this gap in the literature by examining the impact of mood and dispositional optimism on risk-taking and whether these associations differed between undergraduate students from the United States (N = 141) and the People's Republic of China (N = 90). Both samples completed a dispositional optimism questionnaire and an autobiographical mood induction task. They were then tasked with choosing to complete the Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices reasoning task on easy, medium, or hard difficulty for hypothetical money. Selecting harder difficulties was interpreted as more risk-taking due to a higher chance of failure. More positive mood and higher dispositional optimism were associated with decreased risk-taking, i.e., selecting easier puzzle difficulties, in the American sample but increased risk-taking decisions, i.e., selecting harder difficulties, in the Chinese sample (p < 0.05 for all). These findings suggest that the effect of mood and optimism on decision-making may differ by nationality and/or culture.

Increased False-Memory Susceptibility After Mindfulness Meditation.

The effect of mindfulness meditation on false-memory susceptibility was examined in three experiments. Because mindfulness meditation encourages judgment-free thoughts and feelings, we predicted that participants in the mindfulness condition would be especially likely to form false memories. In two experiments, participants were randomly assigned to either a mindfulness induction, in which they were instructed to focus attention on their breathing, or a mind-wandering induction, in which they were instructed to think about whatever came to mind. The overall number of words from the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm that were correctly recalled did not differ between conditions. However, participants in the mindfulness condition were significantly more likely to report critical nonstudied items than participants in the control condition. In a third experiment, which tested recognition and used a reality-monitoring paradigm, participants had reduced reality-monitoring accuracy after completing the mindfulness induction. These results demonstrate a potential unintended consequence of mindfulness meditation in which memories become less reliable.

Regulating the way to obesity: unintended consequences of limiting sugary drink sizes.

OBJECTIVES: We examined whether a sugary drink limit would still be effective if larger-sized drinks were converted into bundles of smaller-sized drinks. METHODS: In a behavioral simulation, participants were offered varying food and drink menus. One menu offered 16 oz, 24 oz, or 32 oz drinks for sale. A second menu offered 16 oz drinks, a bundle of two 12 oz drinks, or a bundle of two 16 oz drinks. A third menu offered only 16 oz drinks for sale. The method involved repeated elicitation of choices, and the instructions did not mention a limit on drink size. RESULTS: Participants bought significantly more ounces of soda with bundles than with varying-sized drinks. Total business revenue was also higher when bundles rather than only small-sized drinks were sold. CONCLUSIONS: Our research suggests that businesses have a strong incentive to offer bundles of soda when drink size is limited. Restricting larger-sized drinks may have the unintended consequence of increasing soda consumption rather than decreasing it.

GAMBLING: SOMETIMES UNSEEMLY; NOT WHAT IT SEEMS.

Gambling offers opportunities for basic research and theory, and has hugely important applied implications. As I have said recently: "The current view of pathological gambling as an addiction cries out for a functional analysis of the controlling variables and for strategies of behavioral intervention." (Fantino, 2008). This view echoed that of Dixon (2007), who called out for behavior analysts to apply their very relevant skills to discovering the causes of gambling disorders. To understand the behavior of gambling, one must understand the basic processes and variables involved in making the decisions gamblers make. Behavior analysts, those experimental psychologists who approach psychological phenomena from a behavioral (or functional) perspective, have long concentrated on the choices organisms make. Thus, they should be in a strong position to contribute to our appreciation of the factors controlling gambling. In this paper we will examine some of the advances already made, and also propose some directions for future research.

How reinforcer type affects choice in economic games.

Behavioral economists stress that experiments on judgment and decision-making using economic games should be played with real money if the results are to have generality. Behavior analysts have sometimes disputed this contention and have reported results in which hypothetical rewards and real money have produced comparable outcomes. We review studies that have compared hypothetical and real money and discuss the results of two relevant experiments. In the first, using the Sharing Game developed in our laboratory, subjects' choices differed markedly depending on whether the rewards were real or hypothetical. In the second, using the Ultimatum and Dictator Games, we again found sharp differences between real and hypothetical rewards. However, this study also showed that time off from a tedious task could serve as a reinforcer every bit as potent as money. In addition to their empirical and theoretical contributions, these studies make the methodological point that meaningful studies may be conducted with economic games without spending money: time off from a tedious task can serve as a powerful reward.

Use of base rates and case cue information in making likelihood estimates.

In five experiments, we investigated college students' use of base rate and case cue information in estimating likelihood. The participants reported that case cues were more important than base rates, except when the case cues were totally uninformative, and made more use of base rate information when the base rates were varied within subjects, rather than between subjects. Estimates were more Bayesian when base rate and case cue information was congruent, rather than contradictory. The nature of the "witness" in case cue information (animate or inanimate) did not affect the use of base rate and case cue information. Multiple trials with feedback led to more accurate estimates; however, this effect was not lasting. The results suggest that when base rate information is made salient by experience (multiple trials and within-subjects variation) or by other manipulations, base rate neglect is minimized.

The rules we choose by.

Hutchinson & Gigerenzer's functional approach to decision making has much in common with behavioral approaches. One of their central points is that "rules-of-thumb" often provide efficient decision strategies, use of which is both rational and generally optimal. We agree, but also caution that the misapplication of rules sometimes leads to non-optimal decisions.

Decision-making: Context matters.

Research and theory in human decision-making has increasingly stressed the importance of the context in which the problem is embedded. This emphasis is consistent with that supported by research of behavior analysts on natural concept formation and in problem solving, as well as in the study of choice. We present data on reasoning problems that further support the role of context in decision-making.

The conjunction effect: new evidence for robustness.

Five studies investigated the conjunction effect (or conjunction fallacy), in which participants report that the conjunction of two events is more rather than less likely than one of the events alone. There was no evidence that feedback or monetary reinforcement for correct answers affected students' performance on conjunction problems. Under some circumstances the context in which the conjunction problem was presented (after questions emphasizing logic or questions emphasizing opinions) affected occurrence of the effect. Location of the conjunction among the statements being rated had a significant effect. The effect occurred with or without a framing description and whether the conjunction consisted of two or three simple statements. However, statements representing the conjunction of three simple statements were (appropriately) judged less likely than those representing the conjunction of two simple statements. The substantial incidence of the effect, even without the descriptive frame and even when incentive and feedback were provided for correct answers, argues for its robustness.

Rules and problem solving: another look.

College students were trained on problems similar to the water jar problems developed by Luchins (1942). Some students were instructed that a particular rule would solve all the problems, others had the same problems but were not instructed about the rule, and a third set of students had a series of novel problems in which no single rule operated throughout. In two experiments students in the instructed rule group not only performed best in training but also performed best when transferred to a condition in which a single novel rule was appropriate. Although results from the set of conditions most similar to those of Luchins suggested that students sometimes inappropriately persisted in rule usage, the overall results suggest that rigidity is not a necessary outcome of instructed problem solving. Indeed, many of the results were consistent with the notion that instructed problem solving is flexible problem solving.